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This paper studies eﬃcient allocation of resources in an economy in which agents are initially
heterogeneous with regard to their wealth levels and whether they have ideas or not. An agent
with an idea can start a business that generates random returns. Agents have private information
about (1) their initial types, (2) how they allocate their resources, and (3) the realized returns. The
unobservability of returns creates a novel motive for subsidizing agents who have ideas but lack
resources to invest in them. To analyze this motive in isolation, the paper assumes that agents are
risk-neutral and abstracts away from equality and insurance considerations. The unobservability
of initial types and actions implies that the subsidy that poor agents with ideas receive is limited
by incentive compatibility: the society should provide other agents with enough incentives so that
they do not claim to be poor and have ideas. The paper then provides an implementation of the
constrained-eﬃcient allocation in an incomplete markets setup that is similar to the U.S. Small
Business Administration’s Business Loan Program. Finally, the paper extends the model in several
dimensions to show that the results are robust to these generalizations of the model.
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Starting a business requires two main ingredients: a productive idea and resources to invest
in that idea. Unfortunately, it is not necessarily the case that whoever has one of these
ingredients also has the other one. Consequently, there is a potential mismatch among
individuals in a society in terms of who holds productive resources and who can use them
most eciently. In a frictionless world, a solution to this mismatch is private markets: those
with ideas (potential start-ups) can borrow from those with resources, invest, and then pay
back. This paper explores how a society should cope with this mismatch in an environment
in which individuals possess asymmetric information at all stages of the process of starting a
business. Ex ante, individuals privately know their wealth levels and whether they have ideas
or not; interim, their actions are unobservable to others; and ex post, they privately observe
investment returns. The paper shows that under these informational frictions, the society has
to subsidize poor agents who start businesses so as to cope with this mismatch. Therefore,
the paper provides a novel rationale for governments to subsidize business start-ups.
Individuals in the model economy live for two periods and are risk-neutral. In period one,
agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth levels and whether they have ideas or not.
Agents with ideas can create businesses that generate risky returns in the next period and
feature diminishing marginal returns to capital. In the absence of informational frictions,
ecient resource allocation involves two separate steps: (1) productive eciency requires
transferring resources to poor and productive agents initially to make sure that all produc-
tive agents can invest at the socially ecient level; (2) distributive eciency then requires
making transfers between agents so as to achieve the desired consumption distribution, which
depends on the welfare criterion of the society.
Unfortunately, it is hardly the case that all relevant information about business start-ups
are known publicly.1 The paper assumes that agents' ex ante types (wealth-idea), how they
allocate their resources, and ex post returns to business start-ups are private information.
The result that poor agents with ideas should be subsidized depends solely on the assumption
of unobservability of returns. The assumption that ex ante types and actions of agents are
private information only limits the scope of this subsidy. The role of each informational
assumption on the results will be discussed in detail in section 3.
In order to understand the intuition for the subsidy result, one rst needs to know what
1See Hubbard (1998) for a survey of the literature on informational problems in capital markets.
1society cares about in this economy. I assume the social welfare function to be utilitarian
with equal weights on every agent. This assumption, together with risk neutrality of agents,
implies that society has a preference only for the amount of total consumption, not for how
it is distributed across agents. The society is only concerned about agents making right
amounts of investment. Therefore, the problem that the society is facing is maximizing
production subject to incentive compatibility and feasibility.
The intuition for the subsidy result is simple. Since there are diminishing marginal
returns to capital, it is socially optimal to have all agents with ideas invest at the same
socially ecient level. However, since returns to start-ups are unobservable, agents cannot
write contracts with state-contingent repayment schedules. This market incompleteness then
implies that agents can, at most, borrow an amount that they can pay back the next period
in the lowest return state.2 This borrowing constraint binds for poor agents with ideas when
they want to invest at the ecient level. If the society can transfer some of its resources
to these individuals, it would relax their budget constraints, enabling them to produce at a
level closer to the social optimal, which is the social objective.
Consequently, this paper focuses solely on productive eciency, leaving aside distribu-
tional concerns. The motivation for subsidy in this model is the need to nance the invest-
ment of poor agents with ideas. In fact, due to the choice of social welfare function and
risk-neutrality assumption, this is the only reason why subsidy is socially desirable.
If the society knew who were the poor agents with ideas, then it would be very easy to
implement the subsidy. However, when there are benets at stake, such as a subsidy, people
can pretend to be poor and to have productive ideas, get the subsidy, and consume it. As
a result, the amount of subsidy going to poor agents with ideas is constrained by incentive
compatibility: agents should not nd it optimal to lie about their wealth and ideas, and use
the subsidy for reasons other than investment.
2Observe that I do not allow for default in the model. Following Diamond (1984), one can add default to
this model by assuming that if a start-up continues to operate after period two, this brings a continuation
value to the owner; if not, then at least some strictly positive fraction of this value gets destroyed. Then,
agents can write state-contingent contracts by conditioning the continuation of a start-up business on the
level of repayment. The fear of losing a fraction of the continuation value can make the agent make the
payment associated with her true return level. In such a world, l state can be interpreted as a default state.
Even though in such a model poor agents with ideas would be able to borrow more than they can in the
original model, one can show that this level would still be strictly less than the amount they need to nance
socially ecient investment level. Therefore, the subsidy result would still be true under this alternative
model. The reason why such an extension can be interesting is because it can make the details of the ecient
social contract more realistic, giving rise to a more realistic implementation. This is further discussed in
section 4.
2Of course, it is possible that the society can try to understand whether people's ideas
are productive, and monitor their wealth and how they use the subsidy. However, these
activities are all costly. The assumption that it is impossible to pursue such monitoring
activities corresponds to assuming that monitoring costs are prohibitively high.3 I accept
that this is an extreme assumption; however, assuming that agents' wealth, ideas, and actions
are perfectly, costlessly observable is also extreme. I focus on the less studied of the extremes.
I conjecture that the subsidy result would still be true if I allowed for monitoring technologies
as long as the cost of monitoring is not zero.
It is important to note that the subsidy result is not an artifact of risk neutrality; it
survives even if agents have strictly concave utility functions. However, in that case, society
would also have a taste for equality that would force a redistribution from the rich to the
poor. Furthermore, since agents would be risk-averse, society would like to smooth their
consumption across states and periods. The risk-neutrality assumption makes it possible to
abstract away from these additional distributive forces and focus solely on what productive
eciency dictates.
A corollary that follows from the subsidy result is that how productive activity (distri-
bution of investment in the current context) should be organized in the economy depends on
the distribution of wealth. This result depends crucially on the existence of informational
frictions. The result and the assumptions behind it are further explained in section 3.
The paper provides a decentralization of the constrained ecient allocation in an in-
complete markets setup where people trade risk-free bonds in a competitive market. Given
that markets cannot provide subsidies on their own, an incomplete markets equilibrium un-
der laissez-faire cannot attain constrained eciency.4 In order to implement the ecient
allocation, the paper introduces two separate institutions to the market environment: a gov-
ernment and a government agency that deals with start-up rms. The government taxes
all agents in a lump-sum manner and subsidizes its agency from its budget. The agency
then subsidizes some individuals from a pool of applicants based only on their level of bond
3Formally introducing monitoring technologies to the model that allow the user to observe another agent's
wealth, idea, or actions and setting the cost of this technology to innity restores the current model.
4Note that I do not allow for markets to open ex ante, meaning before agents know whether they are rich or
poor and whether they have ideas or not. If that is allowed, then the interpretation of the optimal contract
would be completely dierent. Instead of calling the transfers in the optimal social contract subsidies,
we would call them state-contingent payment schedules of the optimal nancial contract written between
agents behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, constrained eciency requires either markets to open ex ante or
government to execute subsidies.
3holdings. The tax-subsidy system is chosen such that only agents with ideas get subsidized.
A comparison of the implementation with the U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA)
Business Loan Program is provided in section 4.
This is not the rst paper to put forth the idea that, under informational frictions,
productive eciency may require subsidizing a certain group of individuals in a society.
Aghion and Bolton (1997) also focuses on output maximization and show when there are
moral hazard problems due to unobservable eort, redistributing resources from the rich to
the poor may increase total output, boosting economic growth. However, the underlying
mechanism behind the subsidy result in the current paper and that paper are completely
dierent. Another dierence of the current paper from Aghion and Bolton (1997) is that
these authors focus on a particular notion of equilibrium, whereas the current paper analyzes
constrained-ecient allocations.
Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman (1991), and Galor and Zeira (1993) are also related
to the current paper. These papers share a common result: in the presence of capital market
imperfections, the distribution of wealth aects the distribution of investment, and hence
aggregate output.5 This is akin to the following result I derive in this paper: the distri-
bution of wealth aects the distribution of productive activity in the constrained-ecient
allocation. However, there is an important distinction between the two results. Each paper
mentioned above assumes that a particular incomplete market structure exists and show that
the wealth distribution aects equilibrium the distribution of investment under this assump-
tion. The contribution of the current paper is that, instead of making arbitrary assumptions
on the space of contracts available to agents, it takes as given the informational frictions
and shows that the distribution of wealth aects productive activity in an economy even
in the constrained-ecient allocation. Consequently, this paper directly establishes that it
is due to informational frictions that the distribution of wealth aects the distribution of
productive activity.6
Another strand of literature that is related to this paper is on optimal venture capital
contracts since both this literature and the current paper consider the question of how to
5Aghion et al. (1999), section 2, not only proves a similar result but also provides a discussion of related
papers.
6Banerjee and Newman (1993) is closer to the current paper in the sense that it explicitly models an
informational friction that causes the market imperfection. However, it restricts the contract space available
to the agents arbitrarily. Therefore, essentially, it also focuses on some exogenously specied equilibrium
notion, not on constrained eciency.
4nance business start-ups.7 In general, venture capital literature focuses on characterizing
the structure of optimal contracts in principal-agent relationships in which venture capitalists
monitor everything but entrepreneurs' eort. The current paper assumes less transparency
between agents by assuming that people cannot monitor each other's investment levels or
output realizations. This rules out the existence of venture capital in the current model.8
Consequently, this paper deals with the complementary problem of how a society should
allocate productive resources in an environment in which agents are more opaque and hence
less capable of allocating resources themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model
formally and analyzes the full information benchmark. Section 3 denes and solves for the
constrained ecient allocation. Section 4 provides an implementation of constrained ecient
allocation similar to the U.S. SBA's loan program. Section 5 studies some extensions and
generalizations of the model and shows how robust results are. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit measure of agents who live for two periods.
Agents are risk-neutral with the instantaneous utility function u : < ! < dened as u(c) = c;
for c  0 and u(c) =  1; for c < 0:9 They are expected utility maximizers with
E1fu(c1) + u(c2)g;
where ct is period t consumption and  2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
At the beginning of period one, some agents are born with ideas and some without.
Let i denote whether an agent has an idea or not. Those who have ideas are called i = 1
7See Admati and P
eiderer (1994), Gompers (1995), and Jovanovic and Szentes (2007) for important
contributions to this literature.
8The paper does not claim that venture capital does not exist in real life or it is not important. However,
given that it requires some resources that are limited in supply (like time of experts) and, hence, serves a
relatively small portion of business start-ups, an alternative less transparent relationship is also present.
9Allowing for negative consumption but setting utility derived from it to negative innity is a convenient
way of securing non-negativity of consumption in the solution. The reason for requiring non-negativity of
consumption is as follows. The only reason why there is any exchange between agents in this model is to
nance investment. If utility function were u(c) = c for all c; then any agent can nance her own investment
by consuming a negative amount. Then, even under autarky full information eciency would be achieved.
5types, and those who do not are called i = 0 types. Let I = f0;1g: The fraction of agents
born with (without) an idea is 1 (0): In order to produce, an agent must have an idea.
Agents are also born with dierent levels of initial endowment of the only consumption
good, w 2 W = fp;rg; p < r: Fraction w are born with initial wealth level w: There is no
endowment in period two. So, there are four types of agents initially, at the beginning of
period one: f(p;0);(p;1);(r;0);(r;1)g:
Agent of type (w;i) operates the following production technology:
y = ik
; 2 (0;1); 10
where k is the amount invested in period one,  is the random return on capital, and y is the
random output produced in period two.  is drawn from the set  = fl;hg; where l < h;
according to the probability distribution ; independently across agents.11 The probability
of drawing l is l and h is h: An agent gets to learn the realization of return after the
investment is made. Hence, agents face idiosyncratic investment risk. The term i is in the
production function to denote that only agents with ideas can start businesses.
There is also a risk-free, linear storage technology that is available to all agents. An agent
who stores s1 units in period one wakes up with As1 units in period two. The assumption
below says that the storage technology is wasteful.
Assumption 1. A < 1=:
The information structure and timing of events are as follows: An agent's initial type,
actions, and period two realized returns are private information. The rest of the data of
the economy is public information. Given her initial type, an agent chooses how much to
consume, invest, and store in period one. Then, in period two,  is realized and hence output
is produced, and the agent consumes.12
One way to think about resource allocation is to consider a benevolent social planner
who chooses allocations for agents. Since consumption-investment choice is unobservable,
10This specic form of the production function is not needed for any of the results; all the results go
through if y = f(k); where f(0) = 0 and f0; f00 > 0:
11The assumption that the cardinality of the set of returns is two is immaterial for any result. All the
results go through if  has any nite number or a continuum of elements.
12Whether  is realized in period one or two is immaterial for the results; the important thing is that it is
realized after the investment decision is made.
6the planner cannot choose allocations directly. Instead, each period the planner makes
transfers between agents based on their reports of their private histories. This way the
planner manipulates agents' actions. In addition, there is no outside party, which means the
planner cannot save or borrow resources through time.13
An allocation in this economy is a vector (c;k;s;)  (c1;c2;k1;s1;1;2); where
c1 : W  I ! <
k1 : W  I ! <+
s1 : W  I ! <+
c2 : W  I   ! <
1 : W  I ! <
2 : W  I   ! <:
In the above, c1(w;i); k1(w;i); and s1(w;i) refer to period one levels of consumption, invest-
ment, and storage of the agent who has initial wealth w and idea i: Similarly, c2(w;i;) is
the consumption level of the agent of type (w;i) who has a realized return  in period two.14
1(w;i) and 2(w;i;) are the levels of transfers received by corresponding types.
Feasibility. An allocation (c;k;s;) is feasible if
P




 wi2(w;i;)  0;
(1)
and for every (w;i) 2 W  I
c1(w;i) + k1(w;i) + s1(w;i)  w + 1(w;i);
c2(w;i;)  ik1(w;i)
 + As1(w;i) + 2(w;i;);
(2)
k1(w;i);s1(w;i)  0:15 (3)
Here, (1) is the aggregate feasibility condition, which says that the planner should balance
13All results go through if the planner can borrow and save at a risk-free rate of 1=:
14Since an agent with no idea cannot produce, her period two consumption is independent of : So
c2(w;0;l) = c2(w;0;h):
15As it can be understood from (2), we assume that there is full depreciation of capital. This assumption
is only made for notational simplicity and is not needed for any of the results.
7its budget every period. (2) is individual feasibility and stands for the fact that allocation
assigned to each agent should be aordable by him. (3) is just the non-negativity constraint
on investment and storage.
Incentive compatibility. Using the terminology of mechanism design literature, there
are two sources of private information in the model. First, there is hidden information: an
agent's initial type and period two investment returns are observed privately by the agent.
Second, agents are involved in hidden action: their consumption and investment levels are
hidden. Hence, they can deviate from an allocation recommended by the planner in two
ways: they can lie about their private information and/or they can choose an investment
level that is dierent from what the planner recommended. Due to these informational
frictions, only incentive-compatible allocations are achievable. I invoke a powerful revelation
principle introduced by Myerson (1982) and characterize the set of incentive-compatible
allocations as follows.
Let (~ w;~ i) 2 W  I and ~  :  !  be agent's period one and period two reporting
strategies, respectively. Also, dene (~ k1; ~ s1) 2 <2
+ as agent's investment strategy. Then,
~ 
  (~ w;~ i; ~ ;~ k1; ~ s1) is a complete strategy of agent (w;i).16 Let   be the set of all complete
strategy proles.
Given the allocation (c;k;s;); for any (w;i); the utility of following a strategy ~ 
 is:
Vw;i(~ 





+ A~ s1 + 2(~ w;~ i; ~ ())]
Dene 
  (w;i;;k1;s1) to be the strategy consisting of truthful reporting and obeying
recommendations, where () =  denotes the truth-telling reporting strategy.
An allocation (c;k;s;) is incentive-compatible if for each (w;i) 2 W  I;
Vw;i(
;c;k;s;)  Vw;i(~ 
;c;k;s;);for all ~ 
 2  : (4)
An allocation that is feasible and incentive-compatible is called incentive-feasible.
16Myerson (1982) calls this participation strategy. Also, note that consumption is not a part of the strategy
since it is implied by the choice of other actions.
82.2 Benchmark: Full Information Eciency
The aim of this subsection is to analyze what society can achieve when everything in the
economy is publicly observable. Full information ecient allocation turns out to be a useful
benchmark for the constrained-ecient allocation. Under the utilitarian objective, the e-
cient allocation with full information is the solution to the following problem:








































k1(w;i);s1(w;i)  0; for all (w;i) 2 W  I:
Since s1 is wasteful, it is obvious that in the full information ecient allocation s1(w;i) = 0;
for all (w;i) 2 W  I:
Assuming that total initial wealth in period one is large enough, the rst-order optimality





The left-hand side of the equation is the marginal social cost of investing an additional unit
in terms of period two utility. The right-hand side is the marginal social benet of investment










as the full information ecient level of investment provided that the following holds:
Assumption 2. Total resources in the economy in period one are sucient to nance






Assumption 2 formally states that cumulative initial wealth is suciently large.17
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then,
1. The full information level of investment for agents with ideas is equal to kfi; irrespective
of their wealth. The full information level of investment for agents without ideas is zero.
2. The full information level of storage is zero for all agents.
3. As long as it provides non-negative consumption to all agents and uses all output,
distribution of individual consumption does not matter.
Looking at the objective function of the full information problem, one can see that
utilitarian welfare with equal weights and risk neutrality together imply that society has no
preference for how total consumption should be distributed, as long as no one gets negative
consumption. The society is only concerned about the right agents making the right amounts
of investment. Therefore, there is a set of full information ecient allocations that are unique
up to the distribution of consumption.
The next section analyzes a problem with exactly the same objective function, but this
time with a dierent constraint set due to private information. As a result, that problem will
be one of maximizing production subject to feasibility and incentive compatibility. Thanks to
Lemma 1, it is clear now that the challenge that awaits the society under private information
is to make agents with ideas invest as close to the full information ecient level as possible.18
3 Constrained-Ecient Allocation
In analyzing the benchmark case, the only assumption made was about total initial wealth.
However, with private information, the comparison of p;r and kfi becomes important. The
17If Assumption 2 does not hold, then the full information level of investment will be a corner solution: P
w ww
1 ; and all the results of the paper go unchanged.
18Of course, without making any agent consume a negative amount.
10rst assumption about this comparison is the following:
Assumption 3. p < kfi < r:
The rst part of this assumption, p < kfi; says that the initial wealth of the poor is not
large enough to cover the full information level of investment. Thus, a poor agent with an
idea cannot operate her idea at the most ecient level on her own. If, to the contrary, p  kfi
were the case, the economy would reach full information without agents interacting at all.
Obviously, this case is neither interesting nor realistic. The second part of the assumption,
that kfi < r; simply says that a rich agent who has an idea can invest at the ecient level
even under autarky. Therefore, Assumption 3 ensures that there is a reason for the planner
to intervene in this economy: to ensure that poor agents with ideas invest at the ecient
level.
The remainder of this section rst denes and then characterizes constrained-ecient
allocation.19
Denition 1. An allocation (c;k;s;) is called constrained-ecient if it solves the












subject to (1); (2); (3); and (4):
As in the benchmark case, the objective function clearly shows that society does not care
about how consumption is going to be distributed among individuals. Consequently, the
above problem is one of constrained productive eciency. This implies there can be many
constrained ecient allocations, all of which have the same investment allocation and hence
the same total production and welfare, but dierent consumption allocations. Nonetheless,
it should also be noted that incentive compatibility arising from private information does
put some discipline on the distribution of consumption across agents compared to the full
information benchmark.
19Throughout the paper, I refer to ecient allocation under the informational problems as constrained-
ecient allocation so as to distinguish it from the full information ecient allocation.
113.1 Characterizing the Constrained-Ecient Allocation
First make the following observation, which simplies the analysis. If transfer levels depend
on period two announcements of agents, then any agent will report the type that brings
the highest level of transfers in period two. Therefore, any transfer mechanism in which a
transfer level depends on a period two shock cannot be incentive-compatible. Consequently,
without loss of generality, the rest of the paper restricts attention to allocations in which
transfers are functions of period one announcements only, 1;2 : W  I ! <:




To understand this assumption, suppose it does not hold. Observe that in order to invest
at the full information ecient level, the poor agent with an idea needs at least kfi   p
additional resources in period one. Also observe that the most this agent can pay back in
period two in low-return state is lkfi: When Assumption 4 does not hold, even in the worst
contingency in period two, the poor agent with an idea would be able to pay back the amount
she borrowed in period one to nance the full information level of investment. Obviously,
in this case, the fact that entrepreneurial returns are private information would not have an
eect. Therefore, no subsidy would be necessary for constrained eciency. The society can
implement the full information outcome by just making sure that simple, not state-contingent
debt contracts are perfectly enforced (by punishing very harshly anyone who does not pay
back the amount she borrowed in period one). Agents, then, sign these contracts that an
set interest rate of 1= and optimal investment would be attained. However, that even in
the worst case an entrepreneur can pay back her debt is highly unrealistic, especially for
businesses that are newly forming.20
The proposition below formally shows that when Assumption 4 does not hold, the full
information allocation is trivially reached without any net present value (NPV) of transfers
between agents.
Before getting to the proposition, dene (w;i) = 1(w;i) + 2(w;i) as the NPV of
transfers an agent gets under a given allocation. An agent (w;i) is said to be subsidized by
20That the lowest return is suciently dire is a standard assumption in nancial contracting literature.
Among others, see Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007).
12the society under allocation (c;k;s;) if (w;i) > 0:
Proposition 1. Suppose that
kfi p
  lkfi: Then, in the constrained-ecient alloca-
tion:
1. k
1(w;1) = kfi and k1(w;0) = 0; for all w 2 W;
2. s
1(w;i) = 0; for all (w;i) 2 W  I;
3. 






2(w;i))(w;i)6=(p;1) satisfy (w;i) = 0; aggregate feasibility, and individual
feasibility with non-negative consumption for all.
In words, no agent gets subsidized in the constrained-ecient allocation.
Proof. Choose 










fi   r; (6)
0  










By Assumption 2, such a  exists. Observe that conditions (5) and (8) guarantee that
transfers sum to zero in periods one and two, respectively. Thus, aggregate feasibility is
satised.
Next, one has to show that non-negative consumption is feasible for each agent under
the proposed allocation. Observe that the NPV of transfers of any agent is equal to zero in
this allocation. In period one, a poor agent with an idea faces the budget c1 + k1 + s1 
kfi and chooses k
1(p;1) = kfi: In period two in the low-return state, her consumption is
c
2(p;1;l) = lkfi  
kfi p
  0 by assumption. This clearly implies that c2(p;1;h)  0;
too. Condition (6) guarantees that (r;1) agent can choose investment equal to kfi and still
consume a non-negative amount in period one. The consumption levels of agents without
ideas are non-negative in both periods by (7):
13The only thing left is to check that given  agents will tell the truth about their types,
but this is straightforward given that the NPV of transfers of any type is equal to zero.
From now on, the paper analyzes the more interesting case in which Assumption 4 holds:
the lowest return to an idea, l; is suciently low.
Remember that, under the ex ante welfare criterion, the only reason why the planner
intervenes in this economy ( 6= 0) is because a poor agent with an idea invests at a very low
level, p; on her own. In order to make her invest at the full information level, the planner
has to set 1(p;1)  kfi  p: Since returns to a business start-up, ; are private information,
period two transfers cannot depend on the returns. Therefore, an agent who is poor and
has an idea can pay back to the society an amount that is at most equal to output she
produces in the low-return state, 2(p;1)   lkfi: This implies that in order to attain full
information eciency, the NPV of transfers going to the poor agent with an idea should at
least be fi  kfi   p   lkfi; which is strictly positive by Assumption 4.
In what follows, without loss of generality, I restrict attention to constrained-ecient
allocations in which (p;1)  fi: This is without loss of generality for the following
reason. The discussion above shows that if (p;1) = fi; then k
1(p;1) = kfi; meaning
full information eciency is attained. Thus, in any allocation in which NPV of transfers
going to (p;1) is higher than fi; the value of the objective function is equal full information
level. Thus, increasing the NPV of transfers going to (p;1) above fi does not change social
objective but only changes the distribution of consumption.
Lemma 2 below shows that the constrained-ecient level of investment for the poor agent
with an idea is strictly increasing in the NPV of transfers she gets under the constrained-
ecient allocation. Therefore, if the society wants to increase the investment level for poor
agents with ideas, it has to increase the NPV of transfers going to these agents.
Lemma 2. In the constrained-ecient allocation, 
1(p;1) = k





Proof. Observe that (p;1)  fi implies that 
1(p;1)  kfi p: If not, then c
2(p;1;l) < 0;
a contradiction. This implies automatically that c
1(p;1) = 0 and hence 
1(p;1) = k
1(p;1) p:
For if not, the agent can decrease her consumption by a small amount and increase her
14investment by the same amount. This would increase her welfare strictly since her investment
level is strictly below kfi when c
1(p;1) > 0; a contradiction.
Now, suppose that 
2(p;1) >  lk
1(p;1)
: Dene a new allocation with transfers ~ 2(p;1) =

2(p;1)  and ~ 1(p;1) = 
1(p;1)+: The resulting allocation is incentive-feasible since the
NPV of transfers is unchanged for all agents. For agents (w;i) 6= (p;1); welfare is unchanged.






Gain in pd. 2
   |{z}
Loss in pd. 2
> 0; (9)
which means the new allocation improves over the constrained-ecient one, a contradiction.













= 1   lk

1(p;1)
 1 > 0; (11)
for k
1(p;1)  kfi; where strict inequality follows from kfi being the unconstrained optimal
investment level. Therefore, (p;1) is strictly increasing in k
1(p;1): Since k
1(p;1)   p  
lk
1(p;1)
 is one-to-one, the converse is also true: in order to increase k
1(p;1); the planner
needs to increase (p;1): Therefore, society has to increase the NPV of transfers going
to poor agents with ideas so as to bring these agents' investment levels closer to the full
information level and thus so as to bring social welfare closer to the full information level.
Proposition 2 below shows that as long as storage technology is wasteful (Assumption 1),
it is incentive-feasible to make transfers to poor agents with ideas with strictly positive NPV.
As a result, Proposition 2 shows that constrained eciency requires transferring a positive
NPV of resources from agents without ideas to ones with ideas when the lowest return to
start-ups is suciently dire. It also proves that there is a threshold level of the return to
storage technology,  A; such that it is incentive-feasible to make transfers to (p;1) with NPV
equal to fi if and only if the return to storage is less than or equal to  A: Furthermore,
15Proposition 2 provides an exact calculation of the constrained-ecient allocation in either
case.21
I have made Assumption 5 below. This assumption is not substantial in the sense that
it is not necessary for the subsidy result. It is assumed merely for the sake of simplicity.
Assumption 5.
a. 1[kfi   p   lkfi]  0p:
b. 1[kfi   p]  0
P
w ww:
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then there exists a unique
 A 
0lkfi
kfi p 1lkfi 2 (0; 1) such that in the constrained-ecient allocation:
1. k
1(r;1) = kfi and k
1(w;0) = 0; for all w 2 W;
2. k
1(p;1) = kfi; if A   A;
k





1(p;1); if A >  A;
3. s
1(w;i) = 0 for all (w;i) 2 W  I;
4. 
1(w;1) = k
1(p;1)   p and 
2(w;1) =  lk
1(p;1)
 for all w 2 W;
5. (
1(w;0);
2(w;0))(w2W) satisfy: (w;0) =  
1
0(w;1) for all w 2 W; and individual
feasibility with non-negative consumption for all.
More importantly, (w;1) > 0; i.e., in the constrained-ecient allocation society transfers
a strictly positive NPV of resources from agents without ideas to the ones with ideas.
Proof. First, I show that (p;1) = (r;1): If 
p;1 > 
r;1; then (r;1) lies to be (p;1) and
gets the transfers with higher NPV; therefore, this cannot be true. On the other hand, if

p;1 < 
r;1; then one can propose a new allocation with a transfer system ~  that is the
same as ; except for ~ 1(p;1) = 
1(p;1)+ and ~ 1(r;1) = 
1(r;1) 
p
r: Clearly, this transfer
mechanism is a part of a feasible allocation. This new allocation is also incentive-compatible:
(r;1) does not lie to be (p;1) since  > 0 is small and agents without ideas do not lie to be
(p;1) since with original transfers they were not lying to be (r;1) and the NPV of transfers
21Under the restriction of (p;1)  kfi   p   lkfi
; the constrained-ecient allocation is unique.
16of (p;1) is still lower than that of (r;1) under the original transfer mechanism. But the
allocation that is attained by this transfer mechanism has strictly greater aggregate utility.
The reason is (p;1) agent's utility increases strictly more than  with the new allocation
since she was investment-constrained under : Then, Assumption 5.b allows the planner to
set 
1(r;1) = k
1(p;1)   p and 
2(r;1) =  lk
1(p;1)
; without loss of generality.
One can similarly show that in the constrained-ecient allocation (p;0) = (r;0):







So far it has been shown that in order to increase ex ante welfare, the planner has to
increase (w;1); and this has to be nanced by taking resources from agents without ideas.
The only incentive-compatibility condition that one needs to check is the one regarding







w + (w;1) +

1(w0;1) (w;1)
A [ 1 + A]; if A(




Here, the left-hand side of the equation is the utility of truth-telling, whereas right-hand
side is the utility of lying to be (w;1): The left-hand side already takes into account the
fact that transfers are such that when agents without ideas tell the truth, they do not have
to use risk-free technology. Hence, they do not use it. The right-hand side already has the







A to have non-negative consumption
in period two. When A(
1(w0;1) + w)   
2(w0;1) this is possible. Otherwise, lying to be
(w;1) implies they have to consume a negative amount in either period one or period two,





1(p;1); (13) implies that k
1(p;1)
units of investment for the poor agent with an idea is attained in the constrained-ecient





1(p;1)   p + w




1(p;1)   p   (w;0)
: (14)















Plugging in the value (w;0); we get k






1(p;1)   p   1lk
1(p;1): (15)
Hence, for A   A; as it is dened in Proposition 2, k
1(p;1) = kfi is incentive-compatible. To
see that for A >  A; k











1(p;1): Then, dene a new transfer system ~  which is identical to the
constrained-ecient one, ; except for ~ 1(w;1) = 




 > 0: This increases k
1(p;1) to ~ k1 = k













~ (w;1) still holds, where ~ (w;1) is the NPV of transfers going to
(w;1) agents under the new allocation. Thus, this new allocation is incentive-compatible. It
is clearly feasible. Finally, it strictly increases total welfare since the increase in (p;1) agents'
welfare is strictly greater than : Then,  cannot be constrained-ecient, a contradiction.
The intuition for why the NPV of transfers going to poor agents with ideas is related
to the returns to storage is simple. Since an agent who is rich and has an idea can imitate
being poor, she has to get transfers with the same NPV. This is why all agents with ideas,
potential start-ups, should be subsidized by an equal amount in the constrained-ecient
allocation. Someone has to nance the subsidy going to agents with ideas. Consequently, in-
dividuals without ideas end up getting strictly negative NPV of resources. But is it incentive-
compatible to transfer resources from agents without ideas to ones with them? Or do agents
with no ideas lie to have an idea and get the subsidy? The answer depends on the returns
to the storage technology, A: The reason is that period two transfers of agents with ideas is
strictly negative, and hence if agents without ideas want to pretend to have ideas, they have
to pay back to the society in period two. For agents without ideas, the only way to carry
resources into period two is via the storage technology.
If A = 0; then it is impossible for agents without ideas to carry resources to period two.
In that case, they cannot pretend to have ideas; therefore, planner can transfer fi to agents
with ideas and attain full information eciency. As A increases, storing resources instead of
consuming in period one becomes less wasteful. There is a threshold level of the return to
storage technology,  A; such that above this level, the benet of lying to have an idea (not
18nancing but enjoying the subsidy) exceeds the cost of doing so. As a result, when A >  A;
agents with ideas cannot be subsidized fi; and hence poor agents with ideas cannot invest
at the full information level, kfi:
Nonetheless, as long as A <  1; some subsidy is still incentive-compatible since A <  1
implies that it is costly to store resources and hence lie for agents without ideas to have ideas.
In this case, the amount of subsidy going to agents with ideas is determined by equating the
benet and cost to the agents without ideas of lying to have ideas.
Proposition 2 shows that under some parameters, the society attains the full information
ecient allocation, even under the informational constraints. This result is an artifact of
risk neutrality and hence will vanish if more general utility functions are assumed. On the
other hand, the main result of Proposition 2, that due to informational problems productive
eciency requires transferring resources from agents without ideas to ones with them, holds
with risk-averse preferences as well.
Proposition 2 also points to an interesting property of the model economy: the distri-
bution of wealth aects the constrained-ecient distribution of productive activity in the
economy. To see this, remember that Proposition 2 tells that when A >  A; the constrained-
ecient level of investment for a poor agent with an idea depends on her wealth level, p:
Now, consider another wealth distribution with p fraction of agents having initial wealth
p+ and r fraction having r 
p
r; where  > 0 and small. This new wealth distribution is a
perturbation of the old one in a way that preserves the mean. By Proposition 2, in the econ-
omy with the perturbed wealth distribution, k
1(r;1) = kfi and investment level for a poor





1(p;1):22 This means that in the current
model, when Assumptions 4 and 5 hold and A >  A; the constrained-ecient distribution of
productive activity depends on how initial wealth is distributed across agents. This result is
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold, and A >  A: Distribution of productive
activity in the constrained-ecient allocation depends on the distribution of wealth.
It is important to note that this result crucially depends on private information assump-
22Here, I abuse the notation, hoping this does not cause any confusion. In the original economy, p denotes
two things: poor agents and their wealth level. In the perturbed economy, p denotes poor agents, whereas
p +  denotes their wealth level. The same is true for r:
19tions. In the full information ecient allocation, investment levels for both agents with ideas
is kfi; independent of how a total of
P
w ww units is distributed across agents. The intuition
for why the constrained-ecient level of productive activity depends on the distribution of
wealth is as follows. Under private information, the marginal social cost of investment is
not only equal to its resource cost. For a given distribution of initial wealth, increasing the
investment level of poor agents with ideas tightens some incentive-compatibility conditions.
Thus, there is an incentive cost of increasing investment in addition to the resource cost.
Changing the wealth distribution changes this incentive cost of investment while leaving
the resource cost untouched. Consequently, between two otherwise identical economies with
dierent distributions of wealth, the resource cost of investment is the same, which implies
that the full information ecient allocation is the same. However, the incentive costs in
these two economies are potentially dierent, making the social marginal costs of investment
dierent, which results in dierent distributions of constrained-ecient productive activity.
3.2 Discussion of Assumptions
This section discusses the role of informational assumptions on the subsidy result. The as-
sumption that ; the returns to a start-up, is unobservable is the sole cause of the subsidy
result. To see this, consider a version of the model in which, for each agent,  is realized
publicly. Assume that initial type, (w;i); and actions are still private information. In that
case, the planner can attain full information eciency without subsidizing any agent, even
under Assumption 4. This result is shown in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Suppose that  is observable for each agent. Then, in the constrained-
ecient allocation:
1. k
1(w;1) = kfi and k1(w;0) = 0; for all w 2 W;
2. s
1(w;i) = 0; for all (w;i) 2 W  I;
3. 




; and 2(p;1;h) such that (p;1) = 0;
4. (
1(w;i);
2(w;i))(w;i)6=(p;1) satisfy (w;i) = 0; aggregate feasibility, and individual
feasibility with non-negative consumption for all.
20In words, no agent gets subsidized in the constrained-ecient allocation.
Proof. Since the allocation described attains productive eciency, we only need to check that
it is incentive-compatible and satises aggregate and individual feasibility conditions with
no agent consuming a negative amount. Incentive compatibility directly follows from the
fact that the NPV of transfers is zero for each agent. Aggregate and individual feasibility is
by construction. That each agent consumes a non-negative amount in any period is obvious
except for (p;1) agent in h state. So, we need to show that 2(p;1;h)  hkfi:
For a contradiction, suppose that 2(p;1;h) > hkfi: By construction, 2(p;1;h) satis-
es
k
fi   p   [llk
fi
+ h2(p;1;h)] = 0:
Therefore, we get:
k











Multiplying both sides by kfi and then subtracting p from both sides gives
k




which contradicts with (16):
The intuition is simple. When  is observable, the planner can make period two transfers
depend on the realization of : Therefore, even if the low state return, l; is very low (Assump-
tion 4), the agent can still pay back to the society the future value of resources transferred
to her in period one, kfi   p; by paying a suciently high amount in the high state. This
proposition precisely establishes that the only reason in the model why the society has to
subsidize agents with ideas is because start-up returns are private information.
The assumptions that initial type and actions are observable imply that the planner
has to respect incentive-compatibility conditions when subsidizing poor agents with ideas.
21Consider, for instance, a model that is identical to the baseline model introduced in section
2, except that initial type, (w;i); is publicly known at no cost. As long as  is unobservable,
the society still has to make fi units of transfers to poor agents with ideas. However, now
it is trivial to make this transfer since the planner knows exactly the agents who have ideas
but lack resources to invest in them.
Similarly, if investment is assumed to be observable, keeping the rest of the model the
same as the baseline model, subsidizing agents with ideas would be trivial. It is not benecial
for an agent without an idea to lie to have one and get the subsidy since she has to invest
it, and hence cannot consume it. The exercise in which everything else is kept the same but
storage is assumed to be observable is the same as assuming there is no storage technology,
or A = 0: From Proposition 2, it follows that in this case, the planner can make transfers
with NPV that is sucient to attain full information eciency.
4 Implementation
This purpose of this section is to provide an implementation of the constrained-ecient
allocation via a program like the U.S. SBA's Business Loan Program.23 I rst introduce the
paper's implementation and then compare it to the SBA's Business Loan Program.
The physical and informational environment is the same as described in section 2. The
main dierence is that there is an incomplete markets structure that allows agents to com-
petitively trade risk-free bonds in period one.24 Bonds pay back a gross return R in period
two that is determined in equilibrium. Individual trades in the bonds market are public
information and there is full enforcement, meaning that no one can die without paying back
their debt.
There are two institutions: a government and an institution of the government that aids
start-up businesses. The government taxes all individuals in the society lump-sum, by an
amount T; and transfers these funds to its institution. Any individual can apply to this
institution for a subsidy. The institution asks the agent to report her wealth, business idea,
23The SBA is the major government institution in the United States assisting business start-ups in partic-
ular and small businesses in general. The total amount of outstanding business loans that small businesses
acquired through the SBA's loan program was $75.5 billion as of scal year 2007. This amounts to 30% of
all small business borrowing.
24That I restrict attention to incomplete markets from the outset is without loss of generality. It is easy
to show that under the given informational assumptions, incomplete markets trade is the best agents can
attain on their own.
22and investment plan, w0; i0; and k0
1; respectively. Then, after observing the amount borrowed
(or lent) and the reports, the institution decides whether or not to provide the subsidy,
(b1;w0;i0;k0
1):
Taking the tax-subsidy system (T;) and the interest rate R as given, an agent (w;i)



















An agent who does not apply for a subsidy (a = 0 agent) would solve a very similar
problem. The only dierence is there would be no (b1;w0;i0;k0
1) in that agent's problem,
and hence there would not be any w0 and k0
1 choice. However, since in the current setup
there is no cost of applying for a subsidy, without loss of generality, assume that all agents
apply.
Below is the denition of incomplete markets equilibrium with a tax-subsidy system.




1. Given R; for each agent, (c1(w;i);c2(w;i;);k1(w;i);s1(w;i);b1(w;i);w0(w;i);i0(w;i);k0
1(w;i))
solves (17);




i wib1(w;i) = 0;






An allocation (c;k;s;) is implementable in the market with a tax-subsidy system (T;)
if, given (T;); (c;k;s;b) with some interest rate R constitute an IM equilibrium.
234.1 Incomplete Markets under Laissez-Faire
Before providing an actual tax-subsidy system that implements constrained-ecient allo-
cation, this subsection rst analyzes what happens under no government intervention, i.e.,
(T;) = 0:
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then, constrained-ecient alloca-
tion cannot be attained in the equilibrium of IM under laissez-faire.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that the constrained-ecient allocation can be achieved.
Then, b1(p;1)   ( kfi   p): Due to linearity of preferences, R = 1=: Thus, c2(p;1;l) 
lkfi 
kfi p
 < 0; by Assumption 3. But this cannot be an optimal choice for the agent since
the agent could do better just by setting b1(p;1) = 0: Thus, we have a contradiction.
Proposition 2 already proved that the constrained-ecient allocation involves transferring
strictly positive NPV of resources from agents without ideas to those with ideas. Proposition
4 then follows since markets cannot make such transfers on their own. A separate entity,
like a government, should intervene and make the necessary transfers between agents.25
4.2 Optimal Tax-Subsidy System
This subsection provides the actual tax-subsidy system that implements the constrained-
ecient allocation.















Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then, the incomplete markets
equilibrium with the tax-subsidy system dened in (18) implements the constrained-ecient
25It is important to note that laissez-faire IM equilibrium is ex post Pareto ecient. However, it is not
output maximizing (ex ante Pareto ecient), which is the focus of this paper.
24allocation.26
Proof. Now I construct an IM equilibrium where R = 1= and agents with ideas invest at
their corresponding constrained-ecient investment level.
Under the specied taxes, an agent faces the following problem:




















1 + Rb1 + As1;
s1;k1  0:
First, consider an agent who has an idea in period one. If a poor agent with an idea chooses
b1   lk
1(p;1)
; she chooses k1 = k











1(p;1);0); which gives strictly greater utility to the agent. s0
1 = 0 follows immediately
from the fact that the return to bonds is strictly greater than the risk-free return; hence, it
has to be that k0
1 6= k







 ; and (0
1(w;0);0
2(w;0))w2W such that 0(w;0) =  1=00(w;1)
and individual consumption levels are non-negative. (p;1) chooses (k0
1;b0
1) in the market,
implying that she chooses k0
1 in the planner's problem when she faces 0: The only thing left
to check is incentive compatibility. That holds because of the way in which the new allocation
is constructed, 0(w;1) = (w;1): Therefore, this new allocation is incentive-feasible, keeps
the welfare of (w;i) 6= (p;1) unchanged compared to the constrained-ecient allocation, and
provides strictly greater welfare than the constrained-ecient level for poor agents with
ideas. This means that the new allocation is an improvement over the constrained-ecient
26Observe that the subsidy function does not depend on any of the agent's reports. This is due to the fact
that the current model abstracts away from any form of monitoring. Hence, these reports are just cheap
talk.
25allocation, a contradiction.
Similarly, one can show that when b1(r;1)   lk
1(p;1)
; (r;1) agent chooses to invest
at the constrained-ecient level, kfi:
Now we need to show that agents with ideas choose b1   lk
1(p;1)
: The utility of












 + b1(w;1)=] (20)










On the other hand, if an agent with an idea chooses b1 >  lk
1(p;1)
; then, letting her





















The dierence between the maximized values of (w;1) agents' problem in the market under
b1   lk
1(p;1)
 and under b1 >  lk
1(p;1)


















Given that kfi maximizes the function  k + 
P
 k; it is obvious that this dierence
is strictly positive for (r;1): For (p;1); under b1 >  lk
1(p;1)
; ~ k1(w;1) < k
1(p;1)  kfi:
This, combined with the fact that the function  k + 
P
 k is strictly increasing in k;
for k  kfi; implies that the expression in (23) is also strictly positive. Hence, we showed
that agents with ideas act according to the constrained-ecient allocation in the market.
Now consider agents who do not have an idea in period one. If they choose b1 
 lk
1(p;1)
; then c2(w;0)   lk
1(p;1)




A : Since A <  1; these agents will invest as little as possible in risk-free
technology. This implies they choose b1 =  lk
1(p;1)
 and s1(w;0) =
lk
1(p;1)
A : The utility






26When an agent with no ideas chooses b1 >  lk
1(p;1)
; she sets s1 = 0 and chooses the
constrained-ecient allocation. The utility she gets is w  
1
0(w;1):
We need to show that, for agents without ideas, utility under b1 >  lk
1(p;1)
 is greater
than utility under b1   lk
1(p;1)





















(   1=A) (25)
= 0; (26)






Market clearing and government budget balance conditions are immediate from the fact
that the constrained-ecient allocation satises aggregate feasibility and has non-negative
consumption for all agents.
The way the implementation works is as follows. An agent who borrows above the
threshold gets a net subsidy of  
1
0(p;1)+(p;1)=0 = (p;1): Remember that this is
exactly the amount of the NPV of transfers agents with ideas get in the planner's problem.
Therefore, agents with ideas borrow at the threshold level, get the subsidy, and invest at
the constrained-ecient level. Agents without ideas would like to do the same; however, for
them, the only way to pay back in period two is to save through the storage technology,
s1; which is costly since s1 is wasteful. The threshold amount of borrowing required to get
the subsidy is chosen such that this cost is weakly higher than the benet of getting the
subsidy. Therefore, only agents with ideas get the subsidy, and hence the budget of the
agency balances.
A comparison between the implementation provided above and the actual Business Loan
Program is in order. The above implementation is similar to the actual system in the United
States in the sense that in both, the government taxes all citizens and transfers some of its
tax revenue to the agency that deals with start-ups (more generally, small businesses), with
the intention of subsidizing potential start-ups (or, more generally, small businesses in the
actual program) that are nancially constrained.27 Also, in both the model and the Business
27The fact that in the paper's implementation all the tax revenue goes to the agency dealing with start-ups
27Loan Program, only borrowers (start-ups) get subsidized.
However, since the model is very simple, there are signicant dierences between the
paper's implementation and the actual system in the United States. Here, I stress two of
those discrepancies and what causes them.
First, there is no default in the model economy; agents only sign non-state-contingent
that they have to honor by assumption. This creates a discrepancy between the model and
the actual program because the actual loan program does not give out direct subsidies but
rather provides loan guarantees to some borrowers. These guarantees ensure the lenders
that in case of default the SBA will pay back a certain percentage of the loan. This, in
turn, causes the interest rate on SBA backed loan to be lower relative to other loans, thereby
eectively subsidizing borrowers.
Second, in real life it is possible to monitor some features of start-ups at some cost, while
the model abstracts away from any sort of monitoring. As a result, the actual Business
Loan Program takes people's reports about, say, their ideas more seriously and spends some
resources (labor) to determine whether or not the ideas are worth subsidizing. In the model,
once an agent sends a report to the agency saying she has an idea, there is no way to check
whether she is lying or not. Therefore, in the model's implementation, the function ; which
determines who gets subsidized and potentially depends on agents' reports, does not actually
depend on agents' reports.
5 Generalizations
The purpose of this section is to convince the reader that the results of the paper are in fact
quite general. I try to do this by changing the model in various dimensions and explaining
how the results still hold in the resulting new environments. For each alteration of the model,
I keep everything else the same so as to focus on the specic feature being altered. Also, for
simplicity I am going to set A = 0; so there is no storage technology.28
is immaterial. One can add exogenous government to the model, G; and then only T   G units would be
transferred to the agency. As long as this G is also subtracted from the right-hand side of the aggregate
feasibility condition in the planner's problem, all the analysis goes unchanged.
28Formal analysis of the rst extension is omitted for the sake of brevity; however, it is available from the
author upon request.
285.1 All Agents Have Ideas
Instead of having some agents have ideas and some not, suppose that all agents have ideas,
but fraction g have good ideas (i = g) and fraction b have bad ideas (i = b):
An agent of type (w;i) operates the following production technology:
y = k
; 2 (0;1);
where, as before, k is the amount invested in period one,  2 fl;hg is the idiosyncratic
random return, and y is the output. The probability that an agent (w;i) receives return 
is i(); where
g(h) > b(h):
So, both agents with good and bad ideas produce, but the former is more likely to get a high
return.
Dene ki;fi as the full information ecient level of investment for agents with idea type
i: Obviously, kg;fi > kb;fi: An analog of Assumption 4 here is that
kg;fi p
 > lkg;fi: Also,
suppose for simplicity that kb;fi < p: So, even the poor agents with bad ideas can invest at the
full information level on their own. It is possible to show that  being unobservable, together
with this version of Assumption 4, implies that constrained eciency requires that agents
with good ideas receive a subsidy. That agents with bad ideas can pretend to have good
ideas limits the amount of the subsidy going to agents who have good ideas. Nevertheless,
this does not completely eliminate the subsidy since it is costly for agents with bad ideas to
lie to have good ideas. The same implementation also works in this environment with some
simple adjustments to the tax-subsidy system.
5.2 Allowing for Negative Consumption





c; if c  0;
c; c < 0;
(27)
where  > 1 is a constant.
The purpose of this extension is to show that our main subsidy result does not crucially
29hinge upon non-negativity restriction on consumption. However, we need  > 1; meaning
marginal disutility of decreasing consumption when c  0 is strictly greater than marginal
disutility of decreasing consumption when c > 0:29 As long as this holds, the constrained-
ecient allocation involves NPV of transfers from unproductive to productive agents.
Full information eciency is the same as it is in the benchmark case: both agents with
ideas invest at the socially ecient level, kfi; and consumption distribution is such that
aggregate feasibility holds with equality and no agent consumes a negative amount in any
period and any state.
Now consider constrained eciency. Since the only change in the physical environment
compared to the baseline model is the utility function, the denition of constrained eciency
remains the same as in section 3. Exact calculation of the constrained-ecient allocation for
any  > 1 is very lengthy and tedious due to numerous cases and hence is omitted.30 Instead,
the paper rst provides a proposition that shows if  is greater than or equal to a threshold
level ; then the amount of NPV of transfers that poor agents with ideas have to receive in
order to attain the full information solution is incentive-compatible. Hence, the constrained-
ecient allocation coincides with a full information ecient allocation.31 Then, the paper
goes on to prove that any constrained-ecient allocation features subsidizing agents who
have ideas, as long as  > 1:
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. Then, there exists a unique  =
1 +
kfi p lkfi
0lkfi > 1 such that if  > ; then in the constrained-ecient allocation:
1. k
1(w;1) = kfi and k
1(w;0) = 0; for all w 2 W;
2. 
1(w;1) = kfi   p and 
2(w;1) =  lkfi; for all w 2 W;
3. (
1(w;0);
2(w;0))(w2W) satisfy: (w;0) =  
1
0(w;1) and individual feasibility with
non-negative consumption for all.
More importantly, in the constrained-ecient allocation society transfers strictly positive
NPV of resources from agents without ideas to those with ideas.
29The reason why  > 1 is crucial is as follows. The only reason why there is any exchange between
agents in this model is to nance investment. If  = 1; then any agent can nance her own investment by
consuming a negative amount, and hence even under autarky full information eciency would be achieved.
30This calculation is available from the author upon request.
31Remember that the full information ecient allocation is indeterminate in terms of individual consump-
tion as long as no one consumes a negative amount.
30Proof. The allocation described in Proposition 6 attains full information eciency, provided
that it is in the constraint set of the planner. Therefore, all one needs to do is to prove
that this allocation is incentive-feasible. Individual and aggregate feasibility conditions and
non-negativity of consumption for all agents at all times and states hold by construction.
Given that (w;1) is independent of w; an agent with an idea does not lie to be a
dierent agent with an idea. The same is true for agents without ideas. Agents with ideas
do not lie to be agents without ideas, since that brings transfers with strictly smaller NPV.
Therefore, one only needs to check that agents without ideas do not lie to have ideas under
the proposed allocation.
Given that no one gets to consume a negative amount in the constrained-ecient alloca-
tion, the payo to those without ideas from telling the truth is w +(w;0): The value from
lying to be (w0;1) is w+
1(w0;1)+




0(w;1)  (w;1) + (   1)
2(w0;1)




Rearranging (28) and plugging in 
1(w;1) and (w;1); we get that the proposed allocation is
incentive-compatible if   1+
kfi p lkfi
0lkfi ; which is the assumption made in the proposition.
Consequently, if  is large enough, the amount of subsidy needed to achieve the full
information investment level, fi; can be reached even in the case with private information.
The intuition is as follows. From the perspective of agents without ideas, the benet of lying
to be an agent with an idea is getting transfers with NPV equal to (1+
1
0)fi; whereas the
cost comes from consuming a negative amount in period two. When  is suciently high,
the cost outweighs the benet and hence deters those without an idea from reporting to have
one.
The rest of this subsection considers the constrained-ecient allocation when  < :
The social planner still transfers strictly positive NPV of resources to agents with an idea;
however, now the amount is smaller than fi due to incentive compatibility.
The social planner's goal is still to make poor agents with an idea invest as close to
the full information level as possible and do this without making her consume a huge neg-
ative amount. This pushes for a subsidy from other agents to poor agents with ideas, and
31incentive-compatibility constraints push in the reverse direction. The constrained-ecient
allocation arises from this trade-o. The following corollary, which follows directly from
Proposition 6 and the discussion above, states formally that in the constrained-ecient al-
location there is a transfer of resources from agents with no ideas to those with ideas, even
when  2 (1;):
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold, and  2 (1;): Then, in the constrained
ecient allocation, (w;1) > 0; for all w 2 W:
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel rationale for governments to subsidize agents who have ideas
(potential start-ups) but do not have enough resources to invest in them. If we accept that
returns to start-up rms are privately observed by the owners of the rms, then constrained
eciency calls for subsidizing poor agents with ideas. If society knew who has ideas but
lacks resources to invest in them, then it is simple to implement the subsidy. However, I
assume here that people's wealth levels, whether they have ideas or not, and how they use
their resources are unobservable to others. These additional private information assumptions
imply that the subsidy going to poor agents with ideas is limited by incentive compatibility.
The paper also provides an implementation of the constrained-ecient allocation similar
to the U.S. SBA's Business Loan Program. Even though the main idea behind both the im-
plementation in the model and the actual Business Loan Program are the same, to subsidize
nancially constrained individuals with productive ideas, there are still signicant discrep-
ancies between the model's implementation and the actual program. This is due mainly
to the fact that the model economy is very simple. Introducing default and/or monitoring
technologies to the model can help to make the implementation look much more like the
SBA's actual loan program. This may be interesting direction for future work.
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